example of Zamfara. This act of legislation was preceded, accompanied and followed by a controversy in which all parties exhibited equal passion and anger. While supporters of the "re-introduction of Sharfa" point to their constitutional right to practice their religion,3 opponents regard some punishments prescribed by the new codes, in particular stoning to death and amputation, as inhuman and degrading, and therefore unconstitutional. 4 In September 2001, Zamfara State Governor Sani Ahmed Yerima, in an interview with the Nigerian daily This Day, described the adoption of Sharfa by most states in Northern Nigeria as politically motivated and intended to allow governors to be re-elected to office. The governor was quoted as saying that only Zamfara and, to some extent, Niger State adopted Sharfa with purely religious intentions, whereas the other states were motivated by political expediency.5 The impression gained from the present overview of judicial practice in criminal trials before Sharlca courts in Northern Nigeria is that the Zamfara State governor seems to be right insofar as many of his counterparts in other states were reluctant to follow Zamfara's example in introducing and implementing Sharfa, in particular as refers to the hadd punishments. The political motivation for this reluctance is probably fear of the reaction of the international community and the Nigerian federal government, through whichwe should not forget -the Nigerian oil revenues are channelled down to the states. In particular, governors belonging to the same political party as their Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), such as Umaru Musa Yar'Adua of Katsina State, Rabi'u Musa Kwankwaso of Kano State, Abdulkadir Kure of Niger State, Ahmed Makarfi of Kaduna State, and Ahmadu Adamu Mu'azu of Bauchi State, found themselves caught between their loyalty to the federal government and the pressure mounted 3 Section 38 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion:
"Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance."
4 Section 34 (1) of the constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment:
"Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly -(a) no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat- by Muslim lobby groups. As we will see, this dilemma seems to have led several of them to introduce Islamic criminal legislation without putting much effort into its implementation. Umaru Musa Yar'Adua of Katsina State was later nominated PDP's presidential candidate and became president-elect in the widely criticised April 2007 presidential polls. Being governor of a Sharf a state did not harm his political career. The fact that Katsina has one of the highest numbers of reported Sharf a trials, shows, if anything, that the political leadership of the states is only one actor among others in the implementation of Sharf a.
The motivation of the Zamfara State Governor to initiate a movement which was to propagate throughout Northern Nigeria, however, can also be described in political terms. In the electoral campaigns of 1999 and 2003, he presented himself as the restorer of Sharf a, comparing himself implicitly to the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate, Usman Dan Fodio, who, in the beginning of the 19th century, united the independent Hausa city-states in what is generally referred to as the Sokoto Jihad. In both elections, this strategy yielded the expected results. A similar strategy brought victory to Ibrahim Shekarau in Kano State in the 2003 gubernatorial election. After 2003, the topic rapidly lost prominence in the Nigerian public discourse. In the campaigns for the 2007 presidential and gubernatorial elections, the implementation of Sharf a does not seem to have played any role.
The most prominent cases since the introduction of the Islamic criminal law (ICL) were those of Safiyyatu Hussaini of Sokoto State and Amina Lawal of Katsina State. Both women were convicted of zind and sentenced to death by stoning, although the sentences were subsequently annulled on appeal. In fact, little is known about the true number of ICL cases in Northern Nigeria or about regional differences in the application of ICL on the state level. In this article I present the available information on ICL cases tried by Sharf a courts in Northern Nigeria in the first five years after the enactment of the Zamfara Sharf a Penal Code. After a short historical introduction and a description of the offences and punishments defined by the ICL codes, I will analyse the situation in particular states. The Nigerian situation is unique in that ICL was introduced on a state level within the legal framework set by a secular federal constitution. Therefore, I seek to identify differences in the introduction and application of ICL in the various states.
Historical Overview
Many Northern Nigerian Muslims regard the "re-introduction" of the criminal offences and their respective punishments as defined by traditional Islamic jurisprudence {ftqti), as a long-awaited step of decolonisation. Islamic law was applied in both criminal and personal matters in Northern Nigeria until the avent of British colonial rule, which was established in the aftermath of Lord Lugard's military victory over the Hausa-Fulani-dominated Sokoto Caliphate in 1902/03.6 The British colonial authorities maintained the pre-colonial Islamic justice system, albeit under their supervision, curtailing the application of the law only in areas which they defined as repugnant to "natural justice, equity and good conscience."7 The British treated Islamic law as a system of customary law applicable to the native population, like customary law systems in other parts of Nigeria during the colonial period.
At independence in 1960, Nigeria became a federal republic composed of three autonomous entities, each dominated by one major ethnic group: the Yoruba in the Western Region; the Igbo in the Eastern Region; and the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region, which in itself accounts for more than half of the Nigerian population. While political life in the Northern region is dominated by the Muslim Hausa-Fulani elite, the area also contains numerous ethnic minorities, in particular numerous small, largely Christian ethnic groups living in the so-called Middle Belt in the Southern part of the region, in addition to Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Kanuri in the North-East.
Since 1960, the Northern region of the Nigerian federation has been divided into ever smaller states on several occasions. By 1996, nineteen different states8 and the Federal Capital Territory around the new capital Abuja shared the space previously occupied by the Northern Region. Within these new states, the ethnic and religious This intention to restore Sharfa in Northern Nigeria notwithstanding, the application of ICL in twelve Northern Nigerian states differs in important ways from the way in which it was administered in precolonial times. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, while empowering states to introduce legislation on criminal matters,14 demands that criminal offences and their punishments be specified in a written law enacted by the federal parliament or a state parliament.15 To be applicable within the legal framework set by the Nigerian constitution, ICL therefore needed to be codified. 16 ICL was introduced in Zamfara and most other states by establishing Sharf a courts competent to hear both civil and criminal cases involving Muslims and those non-Muslims who choose to be tried by them. At the same time, a corresponding legislation has been enacted, in particular a Sharf a penal code that replaced the 1959 Penal Code for the Northern Region in the Sharf a courts. Non-Muslims in these states continue to be tried by magistrate courts that apply the old Penal Code. In Niger and Kebbi States, the changes were introduced by amending the existing Penal Code. Here, the amendments have introduced additional punishments applicable to Muslims with regard to offences like homicide, theft, adultery, defamation, intoxication, rape and causing bodily harm.17 As long as the Penal Code was the only criminal law applied in the nineteen successor states of 14 Criminal offences remain unmentioned both in Part I (Exclusive Legislative List of the Federal Government) and Part II (Concurrent Legislative List) of the Second Schedule (Legislative Powers) of the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, legislation on criminal offences is the sole responsibility of the states. 15 S. 36.12 of the 1999 Constitution: "Subject as otherwise provided by this Constitution, a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written law, and in this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a Law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provisions of a law." 16 In some states, cases of ICL were tried and sentences executed even before a Sharf a penal code came into force (see Peters, Islamic Criminal Law, 13). On the other hand, one important ground of appeal against the stoning sentence inflicted on Safiyyatu Hussaini was the retroactive application of the Sokoto State Sharf a Penal Code, since she had been arraigned before the bill was signed into law. It, therefore, appears that a continued application of uncodified ICL would have been contested on constitutional grounds . the Northern Region there was, in essence, legal uniformity across the region. With the introduction of ICL legislation on the state level, however, this uniformity was compromised. Nevertheless, most differences between the codes are minor and concern the punishments defined for specific offences.
Codifying ICL has changed the way in which justice is administered. Instead of relying on their knowledge of the classical works of Maliki fiqh, the advice of the culamd3 or Muslim scholars, and other instruments of Islamic law, judges in Sharf a courts are now required to base their judgments on the letter of the codes. Previously, most Sharfa judges exercised their profession in the former Area Courts, where they administered Shar'ia as an un-codified "customary" law in matters of personal and family law and applied the less strict Penal Code in criminal matters. In the lower instances, in particular, they seem to have lacked the training and experience to implement the new codified legislation. Rudolph Peters reports from his 2001 field trip to Nigeria:
We heard many complaints that the changes [in the judiciary] were not properly introduced. The judges of the new Shari'a Courts were the same judges who had sat in the area courts, but they had not been prepared nor trained to apply the changes in the legal system. Ignorance of the law of procedure, we were told, seriously hampered the course of justice.18
This fact, together with the absence of Sharf a criminal procedure codes in several states during the first years after the introduction of ICL,19 no doubt accounts for the high number of ICL sentences, in particular in the initial period, which ignored procedural guarantees and evidentiary restrictions defined by Maliki law.
ICL Offences and Punishments in Nigeria
The Sharf a penal codes provide for offences and punishments applicable to Muslims and to non-Muslims who voluntarily consent to being tried before a Sharfa court. provisions of the 1959 Penal Code under the heading of td&r, or discretionary punishment, to which are added chapters defining the hadd offences and the Islamic law of homicide and bodily harm. In addition, the number of offences punishable by corporal punishments (caning or flogging) has been increased.21 The rules with regard to hadd offences largely follow the classical Maliki doctrine.22 %ina, or unlawful sexual intercourse, is punishable by death by stoning, if the offender is currently married or has been married in the past. Otherwise the penalty is 100 lashes. In addition, men are imprisoned for one year. The same punishments are prescribed for rape, sodomy and incest, except that in cases of rape, the male offender is also required to pay the proper bride price (saddq almithl). 23 Qadhf, or false accusation of zind, is punishable by eighty lashes. Shurb al-khamr, or drinking alcohol or any intoxicant voluntarily, is punishable by eighty lashes, according to most codes.
Sariqa, or theft, is punishable by amputation of the right hand from the wrist for first offenders. The definition of sariqa respects many of the classical restrictions on the application of the hadd punishment for theft. In particular the stolen property must have a minimum value {nisdb) and must have been kept in a safe place (hirz).24 However, the codes fail to define the exact monetary value of the nisdb. Some codes specify cases in which, in accordance with 21 classical Maliki law, the application of the penalty of amputation for theft is precluded. 25 The punishment for hiraba, or armed robbery, depends on the gravity of the damage caused. Most codes make it punishable by life imprisonment, if neither property nor life was taken; by amputation of the right hand and the left foot, if property was stolen; and by death, if murder was committed. Some codes prescribe crucifixion as punishment for armed robbery if property and lives were taken.26
The most important difference between the provisions regarding homicide and bodily harm found in the ICL codes and the classical Islamic doctrine is the fact that it is now the state prosecutor who brings the accused to trial, not the victim or the victim's next of kin. However, the basic principle of retaliation (qisds) is respected. This means that, once the court has convicted a defendant of intentional homicide, punishment can be death, if the victim's next of kin demand it. The method of execution is the same as that used by the offender on his victim. In cases of grievous bodily harm, the victim can demand retaliation, i.e. that the convict suffer the same injury as the victim. In most cases, the plaintiffs have the possiblity to remit the qisds punishment and accept monetary compensation (diya) instead. If they remit both, the murderer receives a corporal punishment and/or imprisonment, depending on the ICL code applicable. In cases of unintentional homicide or wounding, the perpetrator must pay diya. The codes, however, do not clearly define the size of diya, setting it variously at "one thousand dinars, or twelve thousand dirhams or 100 camels."27
The chapter on ta'zir of the Sharfa penal codes contains the same offences listed in the 1959 Penal Code. In particular, it includes provisions regarding offences committed by or relating to public servants.28 In defiance of the classical doctrine, Kano State considers embezzlement of public funds a special form of sariqa which is punishable by amputation of the right hand and not less than five 25 To comprehensively assess ICL court practice in Northern Nigeria after the introduction of Sharfa penal codes, a broader foundation is needed than the few internationally known cases. Although official statistics on judicial cases in Nigeria remain unobtainable,32 the relatively free and diverse Nigerian print media and reports by nongovernmental organisations are important sources of information on the judicial practice in criminal trials before Sharfa courts in Northern Nigeria. This valuable source of information calls for careful analysis: Nigerian journalists do not always have expert knowledge of ICL, and most of the print media in Nigeria are based in the South and owned by either the Sharf a-hostile Federal Government or by non-Muslim private owners, most of whom are critical of the "Sharfa project of the North." This is likely to impact on the way they report on ICL cases in the Northern states. Nevertheless, the facts contained in these media reports can provide a general, albeit often enough incomplete, picture of the reported cases. Frequently, the history and the final outcome of a case remain unknown. This is probably due to the thin media coverage of events taking place in Northern Nigeria, in particular on the regional and local level. It may be assumed that the cases reported in the press represent only a small fraction of all criminal cases tried before Sharf a courts in Northern Nigeria. In addition, many cases tried before Sharf a courts involved offences already defined in the 1959 Penal Code, which were taken up by the Sharf a penal codes under the heading of ta'zir. As such, although technically trials under the new ICL codes, they did not constitute anything novel and, therefore, were not reported individually in the media.
The abovementioned NGOs report on some cases that are not mentioned in the media. Many of these cases come to the attention of these groups when their members or lawyers engaged by them visit prisons to talk to defendants in unrelated cases. It seems that many people are charged and imprisoned on remand while awaiting trial, or sentenced and kept in prison waiting for their sentence to be implemented, without the media taking notice of them.
For certain types of cases, i.e. cases whose political sensitivity awakens the media's interest, it can be assumed that the picture drawn by the media is not too distant from reality. Case numbers should be reasonably reliable (a) in cases of zind, or illicit sexual •" These foreign news providers were chosen because they have their own network of correspondents on the ground and do no rely on media or news agencies whose information they might not be able to verify. IRIN, however, seems at times to rely on reports from other news providers.
relations, at least those cases which have been appealed, because these trials have become the symbol, for Sharfa critics, of the incompatibility of ICL and the individual rights guaranteed by the Nigerian constitution, and (b) in cases involving public servants and politicians, because the issue of corruption and the accountability of state representatives arouses great interest in the Nigerian media, irrespective of the Sharfa question. In three states (Borno, Gombe, Yobe), no ICL court cases were reported during this period.37 From Niger, Kaduna, and Kebbi only two, three, and eight cases respectively were reported in this period. This means that almost 90% of the roughly 125 ICL cases identified38 took place in six of the twelve states, i.e. Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara. The last three states alone account for 60% of all cases.
The general trend for all states except Bauchi is that the highest number of new cases reported is found shortly after the introduction of the respective ICL code. Over time, the number of cases reported decreases, until 2004, when no more than seven cases were reported, two in Zamfara and five in Bauchi. One explanation for this trend is that the attention paid to ICL by the media has decreased over time. However, developments in the application of ICL seem to be subject to dynamics on the state level. In order to demonstrate how ICL judicial practice is shaped by the particular circumstances in individual states, I will outline in brief the nature of ICL cases reported from each of the twelve "Sharfa states," beginning with Zamfara and proceeding from there to predominantly Muslim states 38 The exact number of cases is not entirely clear because in some instances the reports do not specify if prison inmates were tried summarily or separately.
in the North-West, then in the North-East of the country. Finally, the religiously mixed states of Kaduna and Bauchi will be discussed. The most frequent indictment in the Zamfara cases is sariqa (theft), with eleven cases involving thirteen defendants.42 In none of the reported cases was the defendant acquitted. Eleven defendants were sentenced to amputation. Only two defendants were reported to have 39 The only indictment for bodily harm in Zamfara State was reported as early as February 2000. A Sharfa court in the state capital Gusau ordered Dantanim Tsafe to pay 157,933.70 Naira (approx. 1,500 US$) for knocking out his wife's teeth in a quarrel. The media reports do not specify who would receive the money. Section 59 of the Zamfara State Sharf a Penal Code stipulates that diya is to be paid to the victim. However, one report mentions that Tsafe's wife pleaded for the "fine" to be set aside, as her husband was incapable of paying. The judge then reduced the fine to 50,000 Naira (approx. 470 US$).46 If unable to pay, Tsafe would have to "submit his teeth for forceful removal." As Rudolph Peters points out, the Sharfa penal codes, unlike classical doctrine, regard diya as a punishment, not as compensation for a civil liability.47 In the present case, this confusion may have been at the root of the wife's plea for a compensation to be set aside which she was entitled to receive.
With regard to zjna and related offences, no stoning sentence was reported from Zamfara between 2000 and 2004. The defendants in In addition to the Sharfa penal code, the Zamfara government enacted legislation designed to impose Islamic conduct. In August 2000, 200 commercial motorcycle riders were arrested for carrying women under a newly passed law prohibiting the transport of passengers of the opposite sex on one motorcycle, if driver and passenger are not married. At least two men, identified as Jafaru Isa and Maniru Abdullahi, were sentenced to twenty lashes.57
It seems that corporal punishments are carried out on a daily basis in the state. Human Rights Watch, relying on information provided by local sources in August 2003, reports that "floggings sometimes took place twenty times a week."58 In light of this, the five court cases for shurb al-khamr (consumption of alcohol) must be considered a small fraction of the real figure.59
Even though ridda (apostasy) is not defined as a crime in any of the Sharfa penal codes in force in Northern Nigeria, in a case reported from Zamfara State two former Muslims who allegedly converted to Christianity were brought before a Sharfa court in April 2002. The case was dismissed.60 This is the only case involving an accusation of ridda reported in Nigeria in the period under review.
Katsina
Under strong pressure from pro-Sharf a activists,61 the Katsina State Government, then headed by Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (PDP), enacted a law establishing Sharfa courts which commenced adjudicating on Sharf a-related matters on 1 August 2000. Pressure on the government to implement the Sharfa seems to have been maintained thereafter. Repeatedly, an independent committee on the implementation of Sharfa, headed by Aminu Maigari, accused the government of impeding the implementation of Sharfa in the state and threatened it with creating chaos if it failed to carry out the wish of the people.62 Among the accusations levelled against the state government was the allegation that it issued a directive to the Sharfa courts not to accept any more cases brought before them by independent, i. four cases involving one of these offences were tried by Sharf a courts in the state before codified ICL was in place.67 Two ICL cases tried in Katsina State attracted widespread attention. The first was the death sentence against Sani Yakubu Rodi for homicide in November 2001. Rodi was convicted of brutally stabbing to death the wife of a high-ranking security officer and their two children while attempting to rob their house. The victims' next of kin demanded retaliation (qisds), and the court therefore ruled that Rodi should be stabbed to death with the same knife used in his crime.68 The method of execution was later changed, reportedly to avert riots.69 He was hanged on 3 January 2001. This is the only publicly acknowledged execution in Nigeria since the transition to a civilian government in May 1999. It is also the only reported execution pronounced under ICL in the period under review.
The second internationally known case was the one of Amina Lawal Kurami, who, after giving birth to an illegitimate baby in November 2001, was sentenced to death by stoning for zina in March 2002 on the basis of her confession.70 The man she said was responsible for her pregnancy, Yahaya Mohammed, was acquitted after swearing by the Qur'an that he was not the father of the child.71 The first appeal against the verdict failed in August 2002, when the court did not accept Lawal's withdrawal of her confession. However, a second appeal, before the Katsina Sharf a Court of Appeal, resulted in quashing the death sentence. By a majority of four to one, the judges agreed that the two lower courts made a mistake of law by failing to carry out a proper investigation into the allegations against Lawal. Instead, the judges pointed out, "the prosecution of the case, when it began, was based on rumour."72 The appeals court accepted Lawal's withdrawal of her confession. It also accepted the argument that there was a possibility for the child to be fathered by her former husband due to a delayed pregnancy ("sleeping embryo").73 The presiding judge was quoted as saying that, although Amina previously had acknowledged the charge, it was clear that she was misled into confessing her guilt.74 Lawal had not been told about the gravity of the punishment for the offence. were sentenced to amputation of the right hand, and no sentence has been reported for the remaining defendant. No execution of an amputation sentence was reported from the state.
In three trials, a total of five men reportedly were convicted of drinking alcohol and given between eighty and ninety lashes.80 Here again, it can be assumed that the real figure is higher. One man was flogged and jailed for indecent behaviour in 2003,81 whereas in September 2002 seven women were given 15 strokes of the cane each in Funtua for "loitering." They had been accused of being prostitutes.82
Initially, the government-appointed Katsina State Sharfa Commission had banned public musical performances as un-Islamic. In fact, two court cases against musicians were reported in April 2001. In Funtua, Dauda Maroki and Gambo Maibishi, two traditional Hausa praise singers, were given ten strokes of the cane in public.83 In the second case, the traditional Hausa musician Sirajo Ashanlenle was pardoned after he promised never to play at weddings again. Of the six identified zind cases in the state, which involved eight defendants,97 the most prominent was the trial of Safiyyatu Yakubu Hussaini, a divorcee who was indicted in October 2001 after being found pregnant out of wedlock.98 Yakubu Abubakar, who she claimed was the father of her child, was acquitted due to lack of evidence.99 Hussaini was sentenced to death by stoning on the strength of her confession, which she withdrew on appeal. The defence then argued that a child may be attributed to a woman's former husband for seven years after the divorce, and that the alleged offence had taken place before the enactment of the Sharfa penal code. In March 2002, Hussaini was discharged and acquitted on procedural grounds. This was the only stoning-to-death sentence reported from the state.
Another noteworthy zind trial was that of Abubakar Aliyu in July 2001. He was indicted for committing adultery with a mentally deranged woman and sentenced to 100 strokes of the cane in addition to one year's imprisonment.100 No mention is made of the woman's fate. According to Islamic law, an insane person has no criminal responsibility, making this one of the rare zind trials in which only the man is indicted. After 2002, no new cases of zind or a related offence were reported. But this does not necessarily reflect the reality: in January 2002, a number of young nursing mothers were being kept in Sokoto prison.101 It is likely that some of these women were imprisoned, with or without trial, after they gave birth to children out of wedlock.
One indictment of a single defendant for shurb al-khamr was reported in April 200 1,102 and one trial of smoking Marihuana involving four Muslims was reported in July 200 1.103 All defendants were punished with lashing. As in other states, this is probably just the tip of the iceberg.
Another case tried in a Sharfa court involved a man accused of selling carrion.104 Mohammed Jobi and Issa Abdullahi, two officials of the state's branch of the National Orientation Agency, were accused of embezzling the cash gratuity meant for a man who was about to retire. They were sentenced in August 2001 to corporal punishment and fine, in one of the few successful trials of public servants under the Sharfa legal system. Finally, Emmanuel Oye and Femi Lasisi, born Christians, reportedly insisted that they be tried before a Sharfa court. They had been charged with "idleness" and "belonging to a group of thieves."106 Possibly, they reckoned that the punishment awaiting them under ICL would be less severe than under the secular Penal Code. allocation (approx. 150 million US$) to local governments in the state was dismissed by a Sharlca court in Dutse for formal defects.120 The judge, however, stated that the immunity of the governor, as guaranteed by section 308 (3), Nigerian Constitution, is not applicable in Sharf a courts.
The conflict between the local hisba and the emirate council was created by the Jigawa State government's approach to Sharf a implementation.121 Supporters of the state government's position responded to allegations of lack of resolve with the argument that Jigawa had opted for a gradual introduction of Sharf a, focussing in an initial phase on the collection and distribution of zakdt, or religiously proscribed alms, and education.122 The city is said to be almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims. Other regions in Northern Nigeria are clearly dominated by the Muslim majority of the population, whereas the mainly nonindigenous non-Muslim communities accept their minority status. In "neutral" Kaduna, by contrast, inter-religious violence has been a frequent occurrence over the last decades.170 As a result of this explosive situation, the implementation of ICL in Kaduna State has taken a different form from other "Sharf a states." After State House of Assembly Members from the Southern (mainly non-Muslim) part of the state threatened to secede if ICL were to be implemented across the state, the state government proposed a tripartite court system to accommodate all sections of the population.171 Area courts were abolished. They were replaced by customary courts in predominantly non-Muslim areas, and by Sharf a courts in predominantly Muslim areas. The magistrate courts continued to exist. In the mixed parts of Kaduna city and other principal towns, the implementation of any form of religious laws was explicitly foreclosed.172 Only a small number of ICL court cases were reported in the three years following the introduction of Sharfa. In November 2003, the state's Grand Khadi announced that two men, convicted by a Shari'a court in Zaria, were to have their right hand amputated soon.173 Between August and September 2003, the Zaria Upper Sharfa Court convicted six men charged with "shop lifting, thefts of provisions, textile materials, a cow and a motorcycle and house breaking"174 and sentenced them to amputation of the right hand. After one year in prison waiting for their judgments to be signed by the governor, their cases were made public by human rights activists, who claimed that the convicts had been tried and sentenced in one day and were not given the opportunity to engage the services of argued that the verdict of the Upper Sharfa Court was correct since Maidoya had confessed to committing the crime.187 Nine of the thirteen reported ICL cases in Bauchi State were indictments for sex crimes: five cases of zind, two for rape, and one each for incest and sodomy. In 2001, Hajo Poki was sentenced to 1 00 strokes of the cane after she was convicted of zind. She had been found pregnant out of wedlock.188 The sentence was to be carried out after the delivery of the baby. However, some reports indicate that it was executed while Poki was still pregnant.189 A similar case is that of Adama Yunusa, who, in early 2002, tried to drag the man who she alleged had impregnated her to court to make him assume his responsibilities as the father of her child. When she failed to prove her case, she was sentenced to 100 strokes of the cane and banned from the area. The judgment was confirmed by an appeals court, which, however, revoked the banishment.190
In June 2002, Yunusa Rafin Chiyawa was sentenced to death by stoning for having sexual relations with the wife of a neighbour, after he declined repeated opportunities to withdraw his confession to the act.191 The woman was acquitted after she swore on the Qur'an that she had been hypnotised by Chiyawa. Human Rights Watch reports that Chiyawa's sentence was overturned in November 2003. 192 With the exception of the case of Abubakar Aliyu in Sokoto State, this is the only known case in which a man was convicted and the woman was discharged and acquitted.
No new zind cases were reported in 2003, although the year witnessed three other trials for sexual offences: in September 2003, Jibrin Babaji was sentenced to death by stoning after he was found guilty of sodomy with three boys between the ages often and thirteen years.193 The boys were given six strokes of the cane each, allegedly for accepting ten Naira (approx. seven US cent) for their sexual services. The stoning-to-death sentence was overturned on appeal in March 2004 on the grounds of procedural shortcomings at the initial trial. The lower court judge was ordered to tender an unreserved apology to the three boys and pay them compensation. 194 In October 2003, Adamu Jugga was dragged before a Sharfa court by a woman who accused him of raping her.195 The outcome of the trial has not been reported.
In late December 2003, the Alkalere Upper Sharfa Court sentenced Umaru Tori to death by stoning and his fifteen-year-old step-daughter Altine Tori to 100 strokes of the cane, to be administered after the delivery of the child she was carrying at the time of the trial.196 They were convicted of incest.197 Umaru Tori confessed to the offence,198 and a police officer testified in court that Altine Tori tried to resist her step-father when he had forceful sexual intercourse with her.199 It appears, however, that this testimony was not interpreted in Altine 's favour. The sentence was appealed in January 2004. Altine Tori's defence counsel argued that the court should have taken into account that Altine had been forced to commit adultery, that she was a minor at the time of the offence, and that there was no definitive proof of the offence as required by Islamic law.200 Umaru Tori's appeal was upheld on 24 May 2005 by the Bauchi State Sharfa Court of Appeal, which ordered that the case be retried before the Upper Sharia Court in Kobi.201 This trial exemplifies the vulnerability of women in rape cases, in which the burden of proof rests on the victim due to the fact that consensual intercourse out of wedlock is a criminal offence (zind). 202 In 2004, three more trials for sexual offences were reported from Bauchi State. Not much information is available on the stoning-todeath sentence against Selah Dabo for rape in September 2004. 203 Two women were sentenced to death by stoning by a court of first instance in September and October 2004, respectively. Their sentences were overturned on appeal: Daso Adamu was acquitted in December 2004 on the grounds of the possibility that her pregnancy was caused by her former husband.204 In addition, the appeal judge held that the initial trial was improper because the defendant had been dragged to court and tried against her wishes. Nineteen-year-old Hajara Ibrahim was initially sentenced to stoning to death and 100 strokes of the cane after she confessed to having intercourse with a man she said had promised to marry her.205 Apparently, the lower court learnt of Ibrahim's pregnancy when her father attempted to drag her fiance to court in connection with his daughter's pregnancy.206 The latter, however, was discharged and acquitted due to lack of evidence.207 The sentence was anulled in November 2004 due to procedural flaws in the initial trial. The trials of Daso Adamu and Hajara Ibrahim were the latest cases of stoning-to-death sentences for zind which were reported in the first five years of ICL implementation in Northern Nigeria.
Among ICL cases from Bauchi State, sex crimes are predominant. In the only case of sariqa that was reported in the media, Abdul Jolly Hassan was convicted, in June 2002, of stealing eighteen sheep, worth 50,000 Naira (approx. 360 US$). He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and forty strokes of the cane. The hadd punishment of amputation for theft was not applied because the animals were not kept in a cage and, therefore, the requirement of hirz was not met. 208 However, a considerable number of amputation sentences -for indictments of sariqa or as a result of qisds -apparently were handed down in Bauchi without attracting the media's attention. If the figures provided are accurate, media reports illustrate well the problem, already highlighted in other states: defendants sentenced to amputation or stoning to death are remanded in prison for an undetermined period awaiting the execution of the punishment. In June 2003, twelve people were waiting to be stoned to death or have a limb amputated. The sentences required endorsement by Bauchi State Governor Ahamdu Adamu Mu'azu (PDP).209 In January 2004, twenty-two persons were waiting for the governor to assent to their amputation sentences, while two people, Chiyawa and Jibrin Babaji, were awaiting the execution of their stoning sentences.210 By October 2004, the number of amputation sentences had risen to twenty-three, while the total number of stoning-to-death sentences imposed in the state was five.211 In November 2004, the number of convicts awaiting amputation was twenty-eight.212 By December 2004, the number of people awaiting execution of their stoning sentence had possibly decreased to two, after four stoning sentences -those of Rafin Chiyawa, Jibrin Babaji, Hajara Ibrahim and Daso Adamu -were quashed on appeal.213 This unsatisfactory situation has prompted reactions from different quarters. Governor Mu'azu has come under pressure from human rights groups214 and Muslim groups215 to set aside or implement amputation sentences, respectively.
It cannot be excluded, on the basis of the fragmentary data available, that other Northern Nigerian states have experienced a similar development in the numbers of amputation sentences to be executed. Nevertheless, the situation in Bauchi appears to be unique in that it is the only state in which the number of newly reported ICL cases has increased over time. This may be explained by more intensive media coverage in the state. However, it is remarkable that in the great urban centres in Northern Nigeria, such as Kano and Kaduna, where media presence presumably is higher than in the remote Bauchi State, and even in states such as Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina, which present high numbers of ICL cases reported, numbers of identified cases decrease over time. Thus, the increase of cases, with a predominance of sex crimes, in Bauchi State calls for an explanation.
As mentioned, Bauchi is a religiously mixed state. . Christian fundamentalist movements also appear to be active in Bauchi State. They sometimes even claim that Christians make up more than half of the population of the state, which is hardly believable.
by overzealous Sharfa partisans. In an unprecedented move in December 2002, he publicly advised Sharfa judges in the state not to rush to judgment of women accused of adultery on the basis of pregnancy out of wedlock and thus threatened with death by stoning. He said, with reference to the legal concept of the "sleeping embryo," that a pregnancy manifesting itself up to five years after a divorce may be attributed to the former husband.218 The fact that no such case had been reported from Bauchi State at that time lends greater significance to this announcement. It is possible that the Iiala and other groups that seek to enforce an Islamic way of life are pressuring Sharfa judges, in particular on lower -thus more accessible -levels, to accept charges of zind brought before them. As mentioned above, the only two stoning-to-death sentences for zind reported in Northern Nigeria in 2004 were pronounced by lower Sharfa courts in Bauchi State. Both verdicts were annulled on appeal.
Conclusion
Since I intend to discuss the interpretation of Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria in subsequent articles in greater detail, I limit myself here to the political and socio-political aspects of the introduction of Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria.
The debate triggered by the efforts to introduce an Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria touched on the question of identity and the future of the Nigerian nation, as outlined by the Northern Nigerian political scientist and human rights activist Jibrin Ibrahim:
For the pro-Shari'a group, democracy is meaningless without religious freedom, the most important aspect of which is the right to exercise their religion fully, which is impossible without the full implementation of the Shari'a. For the anti-Shari'a group, the full implementation of the Shari'a is a political transformation indicating the establishment of an Islamic state and the persecution of non-Muslims.219
The reintroduction of Sharfa, in particular the imposition of strict sexual morals, serves as an identity marker among Muslims by creating the impression that corruption and decadence are the result of a loss of Muslim values. Hence the emphasis on sexual morality. The popular support that has resulted from this identity building has, at least in the initial phase, spread throughout Northern Nigeria. It can be assumed that religious lobby groups have played a role in this rapid propagation. However, Northern Nigeria is not a homogeneous entity and populations in different parts of the region have shown varying levels of dedication to the project heralded by Zamfara State, a fact which also seems to have influenced judicial practice in criminal cases in Sharf a courts. This is best illustrated by the differences in case numbers reported from the North West and the North East of the country. In the Hausa states of the North West, such as Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa and Kano, where identification with the historic precedent of the Sokoto Caliphate is strongest, the number of ICL cases identified is high. This may be linked to the activities of state-controlled or independent Sharf a enforcement groups, which bring infringements of the Islamic rules of conduct to the attention of Sharf a courts. By contrast, in the North-Eastern states, such as Borno, Yobe and Gombe, where the majority of the population belongs to the Kanuri ethno-linguistic group, the introduction of Sharf a in the Zamfara style was widely perceived as a Hausa project. The Islamic identity in these states is shaped by the historical experience of the much older Muslim Kanuri kingdom of Kanem-Borno and its more introspective Islamic tradition. "It is for this reason, and coming from such a historical background," writes political scientist and Kanuri intellectual Kyari Tijani in 2002, "that neither the people of Borno nor their leaders or ulama ever understood the furore, now raging over the Shari'a in Nigeria."220
It is in religiously mixed states, however, that the symbolic, and therefore political, value of Sharf a has had the most devastating consequences. Here, it is less the number of cases that is of importance than the fact that one religious community is able to prevail over the other by either introducing or preventing Sharf a. Jibrin Ibrahim argues that the creation of ever smaller states in Nigeria since independence has led to the redefinition of new (ethnic or religious) majorities and minorities on the state level. These groups compete 220 Kyari Tijani, "Issues in the Shari'a debate -learning from Al-Kanemi (a political economy perspective)," Borno Museum Society Newsletter nos. 50&51 (January-December 2002), 7-31, esp. 31.
for hegemony and access to public resources. As the 1991 census, and again the 2006 census, did not pose the question of religious affiliation, it is not known which of the two major religions, Islam or Christianity, is the majority in these states. "Political entrepreneurs use religious mobilisation to enhance their legitimacy at the local and national level."221 Consequently, in states such as Kaduna, Plateau, and Bauchi, where there is no common assessment as to which community holds the majority of the population, violent confrontations between Muslims and Christians over the introduction of Sharfa have broken out. In Kaduna, the state government found a compromise aiming at accommodating the divergent interests in an attempt to limit the tensions. In Plateau State, the government, under the Christian Joshua Dariye, did not introduce Sharfa at all. The most interesting state in this regard, however, is Bauchi, which usually receives little attention outside its own borders. As in neighbouring Plateau State, so too in Bauchi, Christian and Muslim missionaries compete for influence over the population. Both communities claim to be the majority. Thus, in the struggle for political influence, it is essential for Islamic lobbies to establish that Bauchi is a true "Sharfa state." We can assume that some of their members are motivated to "promote" ICL by dragging presumed offenders -here again emphasis is obviously placed on sexual offenders -to court or by exerting leverage on judges to obtain the desired sentence. In addition, the improper implementation of the changes in the judiciary and the lack of training for Sharfa judges leave the courts vulnerable to external pressure.
Has the introduction of Islamic Criminal Law had an impact on the living conditions in the affected states?
In early 2004, Auwalu Hamisu Yadudu, Professor of Law at the Bayero University in Kano stated that "sufficient time has not elapsed from the first gale of the adoption of shari'ah, which commenced late in 1999, to the present, to lead to the emergence of any discernible trend or pattern."222 Yadudu may be right that judicial practice will develop over time and that certain trends or patterns will become clearer. For the time being, I will content myself with identifying the expected results which have not yet materialised. As pointed out in the beginning of this article, it was expected that the introduction of Sharfa would guarantee security for life and property, reduce corruption and promote good governance.
With regard to security for life, only six cases of homicide and bodily harm tried before Sharfa courts have been identified across the twelve states over a period of five years. This figure is numerically and statistically insignificant. As for security of property, I have identified at least thirty-eight trials for theft and robbery and fortytwo people who were sentenced to amputation of the right hand. Many more amputation sentences are probably unreported. Three amputations were carried out, in 2000 and 2001. Since 2001, the governors have been reluctant to approve amputation sentences. Some people sentenced to amputation have been released after being remanded to prison for a prolonged period. In practice, this means that they suffered a punishment different from their sentence. To date, no one has raised the question if amputation sentences are to be pronounced and carried out in the future. The answer to this question will probably depend on the political climate and, therefore, on the activities of religious groups. The danger that any decision in this field will spark violent reactions should not be underestimated.
Finally, the promotion of good governance falls into the realm of the ta'zir legislation, which covers offences committed by public servants. However, only four indictments of a total of ten public servants have come to light. In two cases, no sentence was reported. The indictment of the governor of Jigawa State was dismissed. Since indictments of representatives of public authorities generally attract high attention in the Nigerian media, it is unlikely that the number of indictments of public servants is much higher than this. The low number of cases suggests that the introduction of ICL has not had a great impact on public service in the states implementing ICL. A handful of cases against low and medium-ranking officials cannot be considered a strong deterrent, which is the main goal of Islamic Criminal Law.
Clearly, the expectations about the benefits that would accrue from the implementation of Sharfa were inflated. The resulting disillusionment, however, may motivate Northern Nigerian politicians to create more realistic policies, as pointed out by Philip Ostien:
The expected benefits are those associated in many religions with return by the people to conformity with the will of God. But quite probably, notwithstanding the implementation of shari'a, the world will wag on much as it always has, and the governments of the implementing states will find that they still have a great deal to do to trim bloated bureaucracies, reform education, fight crime and corruption, foster development, encourage investment, and so on and on. The point is that having implemented shari'a, having, so to speak, cleared away that issue, they will be free to focus on the more immediate causes of their problems and perhaps to address them more realistically than they have in the past.223
This prediction, made at an early stage of the reintroduction of ICL in Northern Nigeria, seems to be confirmed by the virtual absence of the topic in the campaigns for the presidential and gubernatorial elections in Nigeria in April 2007. 
